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Reflections
Michael Watts
Interviewed by Murat Arsel
Michael Watts is ‘Class of 1963’ Chair in Undergraduate Studies and Chan-
cellor’s Professor of Geography at the University of California, Berkeley.
Born and raised in rural southwest England,Watts studied at University Col-
lege London and completed his PhD in 1979 at the University of Michigan.
Bringing long-term ethnographic research in Africa and critical engagement
with Marxist political economy to bear on themes such as Third World
poverty, food security, the agrarian question, oil-led development and vi-
olence, Watts has long been a leading figure in development studies and
African studies as well as being instrumental in the development of the field
of political ecology. Having published numerous articles in scholarly jour-
nals in geography and beyond, he is also the author and editor of several
books including Silent Violence (1983), Reworking Modernity: Capitalisms
and Symbolic Discontent (1992, with A. Pred), Liberation Ecologies (1996
and 2004, with R. Peet), The Hettner Lectures: Geographies of Violence
(2000), Violent Environments (2001, with N. Peluso) and the Curse of the
Black Gold (2008, with photographer Ed Kashi). He was director of the
African Studies Centre from 2005 to 2008 and of the Institute of Inter-
national Studies at Berkeley from 1994 to 2004. He has been named a
Guggenheim fellow, a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Study in
Behavioral Sciences, and is currently completing a book on oil and insur-
gency in Nigeria.
MA: There is much written about the current global financial crisis, yet
very little of it has focused on its impact on developing nations. Could
you comment on how this crisis is affecting Nigeria where you have
conducted extensive fieldwork?
MW: This question of how the financial crisis unleashes new strains, fissures
and tensions across the global south— and Nigeria in particular — is,
I think, very complicated. This complexity resides in part in the differ-
ential structures of national economies and their different exposures
to, and dependencies upon, key Euro-American banking institutions
(and the world economy more generally) and also in the temporal
dynamics of the impacts which are both immediate and longer term.
In the same way, the proximate effects of the 1997–98 Asian crisis
were to throw millions of people into poverty across the region, but
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it also had longer term structural effects on the character of develop-
ment strategies — the model of development — among Asian states.
There is in addition the analytical challenge of thinking through what
the character of the ‘financial crisis’ actually is and what it repre-
sents. It is one thing to talk of the collapse of investment houses and
the drying up of credit or the devaluation (or total loss) of invest-
ment funds held by the Ecuadorian state or prosperous Indian middle
classes. It is quite another to trace how the deregulated speculative
activities of the banks (and the monstrous failure — or should we say
complicity — of the credit rating agencies and the financial oversight
institutions) are inseparable from, first, their enormous speculative
impact in various commodity markets upon which many developing
states depend, and second, their relation to the operations of the black
or illicit economy — particularly the explosion of high level corpo-
rate and governmental corruption. (In February 2009, for example,
Halliburton was found guilty in a US Court of massive corruption in
its operations in the Nigerian oil and gas sector.) Not least a financial
crisis narrowly construed — a product of the development of finan-
cial instruments and forms of insurance which in practice generated
enormous new risks — has now morphed into something like a gen-
eralized economic recession. At the time of writing, the US economy
is shedding half a million jobs a month. In my own state of Califor-
nia unemployment is over 11 per cent, tent cities for the homeless in
Sacramento and elsewhere resemble the Great Depression, a massive
public educational system is in financial free fall, and rural unemploy-
ment in some of the agricultural counties is as high as 30 or 40 per
cent. All of these phenomena are, in other words, of a piece, and need
to be conceptually held together in thinking through the ‘impacts on
developing nations’.
This approach might help us think about how the crisis is specifi-
cally being felt in Nigeria by considering its political economy and its
hypertrophied form of oil dependency. Nigeria is the eleventh largest
producer and the eighth largest exporter of crude oil in the world.
National oil production (crude and natural gas liquids) is currently
running at roughly 1.6 million barrels per day (b/d) — a significant
decrease from a longer running average of about 2.3 million b/d —
which reflects the devastating consequences of a home-grown insur-
gency that has emerged in the Niger delta since late 2005. It has
crippled the industry. Nigeria also contains the largest natural gas
reserves in Africa and is a global player in the production of lique-
fied natural gas (LNG). Oil has seeped deeply and indelibly into the
political and economic sinews of Nigeria. In 2008 over 87 per cent
of government revenues, 95 per cent of foreign exchange earnings,
96 per cent of export revenues and almost half of Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) was accounted for by oil and gas. In 2008, with oil
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prices way over US$ 100 a barrel, the government pocketed perhaps
US$ 75 billion.
Nigeria is an oil-state driven by two cardinal political principles:
how to capture oil rents and how to sow the oil revenues? In practice,
the politics of oil capture and allocation have been utterly disas-
trous — it has generated nothing short of a failed and ruinous form of
secular national development. To compile an inventory of the achieve-
ments of Nigerian petro-development is a salutary, if dismal, exercise:
85 per cent of oil revenues accrue to 1 per cent of the population.
According to former World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz, around
US$ 300 billion of the US$ 600 or so billion in oil revenues accrued
since 1960 have simply ‘gonemissing’.1 Nigerian anti-corruption czar
Nuhu Ribadu — a remarkable and brave, some would say suicidal,
figure who oversaw the arrest of a number of hugely corrupt Nige-
rian state operatives and was recently hounded out of the country in
the wake of his being fired from the Economic and Financial Crimes
Commission — claimed that in 2003, 70 per cent of the country’s oil
wealth was stolen or wasted; by 2005 it was ‘only’ 40 per cent. Over
the period 1965–2004, the per capita income fell from US$ 250 to
212, while income distribution deteriorated markedly. Between 1970
and 2000, the number of income poor grew 19 million to a staggering
90 million. Over the last decade GDP per capita and life expectancy
have, according to World Bank estimates, both fallen. According to
the UNDP, Nigeria ranks in terms of the Human Development Index
below Haiti and Congo. It is not a pretty picture — whether viewed
from the office of the American academy or experienced from the
vantage point of the Lagos slum world.
But your question about the impact of the crisismust start from these
sets of prior conditions I sketched which preceded the immediate ef-
fects of the financial meltdown as they gathered momentum in the
middle of 2008. The reality was a remarkable run-up in oil prices —
the third oil boom following the early 1970 and 1980 booms—which
peaked at almost US$ 150 a barrel in July 2008. The volatility of
the oil market and the massive influx of petro-dollars to oil-states
like Nigeria is conventionally explained in terms of the end of ‘easy
and cheap oil’ to deploy the industry cliche´ (a variant of the Peak
Oil scarcity argument), limited OPEC spare capacity, and most espe-
cially the demand-driven effects of the Chinese and Indian economic
booms. But these forces cannot possibly explain the rapidity with
which prices rose (and subsequently fell). As Randall Wray (2008)
has brilliantly shown, commodity prices (especially food) were driven




by speculation in futures markets, especially by the rise of commodity
indexes. Finance capital was driving the oil boom which, as a specu-
lative bubble, was popped with the collapse of the banks in late 2008,
but was also driven by the same forces which, over the course of 2008,
were investing in commodities as the ‘derivatives economy’ began to
unravel.
In the short term, the Nigerian government has been compelled to
radically scale back its 2009 budget on the basis of expected lower
oil proceeds. But even so the federal government will run a deficit of
at least 5 per cent of GDP (and in the current account of over 11 per
cent), perhaps much more if President Yar’Adua cannot restrain, as
seems likely, popular pressures on his proposed cuts in subsidies and
other popular programmes. The Economist (2008) points out that the
crisis will have dramatic impacts on Nigeria’s private sector and on its
fiscal policy. The Nigerian Naira collapsed by almost 30 per cent in
five months with further falls to come. The political pressures against
reduction in public spending will be enormous — the oil workers
unions have threatened strike action already over the insecurity in the
delta and the layoffs within the industry — and by the same token the
ability of Nigeria to operate within its OPEC quota under these con-
ditions seems slight. Thus, the financial crisis is only now beginning
to be felt in Nigeria (a reflection in part of the ‘excess revenues’ built
up during the oil price increases) and the real test is to come: whether
Yar’Adua, who will be increasingly concerned now with the run up to
the next elections, will in conditions of considerable austerity over the
next year, be able to keep a lid on the deep and contradictory forces of
insurgency in the oil fields, popular resentments in the slums worlds
where vast armies of the poor are barracked, and ferocious infight-
ing among the political class jockeying for oil rents and a strategic
position in the run up to 2011. The military assault — a massive
counter-insurgency effort — launched on 13 May 2009 on militants
operating in the oilfields is a measure of the gravity of the crisis.
There is also the related question of how the headlong rush into
ethanol production propelled by the prior oil price boom ramifies
through an import-dependent food economy. The global conversion
to biomass for ethanol has, we now know, had important implications
on the price of staple food prices. Nigeria imported US$ 27 billion
in foodstuffs in 2008 and currently only provides 20 per cent of
its domestic rice needs. Popular resistance to this price volatility is
already a political issue.
MA: How does the spectacle of global financial collapse look from the
vantage point of the Niger River Delta?
MW: This is not an easy question to answer. Who in the Niger delta is look-
ing at the ‘spectacle’ of financial collapse? The political class? The
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oil industry? The armies of urban unemployed? The desperately poor
women in the creeks? The insurgents? Let me start, however, with
your reference to the financial crisis being a spectacle. This word car-
ries a precise meaning for me and a collective I work with in the Bay
Area (RETORT) — namely the idea associated with American em-
pire (the ‘War on Terror’) of an image war (for example the American
demand that Picasso’s Guernica be removed from the United Nations
antechamber), a battle that Mr Rumsfeld, faced with the clever me-
diatic work of the likes of Messrs Zawahiri and bin Laden, felt the
US was losing. Taken from Guy Debord, the idea was of new forms
of state control and the colonization of everyday life in which the
spectacle represented a new form of capital accumulation. It gave a
name to the process by which ‘more and more facets of human socia-
bility . . . [are submitted] to the deadly solicitations . . . of the market’
(RETORT Collective, 2005: 19). In this sense the collapse of, and
the state response to, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers can be read
in spectacular terms. The collapse is an image event — Wall Street
operatives leaving their offices with cardboard boxes or papers, Ponzi
schemers brought to trial, CEO of banks marched before Congres-
sional committees — in which, in the desperate weeks of September
and October 2008, Hank Paulson and friends held a gun to the heads
of the US body politic and said that without US$ 700 billion the world
as we know it would implode. It is an image event but not only an
image event, of course.
The state in particular — and the burden is now on the new Obama
administration within its phalanx of advisors who were critical in the
deregulation of derivatives markets at the end of the Clinton regime—
must manage this crisis and especially their relationship with the
power of US finance capital and the revolving door of theWall Street–
Treasury. It is one thing for the public to see finance capitalists force
marched onto Capitol Hill, but quite another to have bailout packages
used to pay huge bonuses to people who drove the credit default swaps
in the first place. Until now the entire spectacle of financial crisis —
which resembles nothing more than a mixture of organized crime and
massive fraud (a rather different sense of the unleashing of ‘animal
spirits’ than is the conventional wisdom on the crisis) — confirms
nothing more than a culture of impunity. When will we see someone
on our TV screens heading off to do time on Rikers Island or at San
Quentin? (A culture of impunity, incidentally, added to by Obama’s
recent decision, in the context of the disclosure of the torture memos,
to not hold anyone accountable). There is a sense in which Obama has
presided over the recomposition and consolidation of finance capital,
funded with tax payer dollars and a culture of fear (‘too big to fail’).
So this is a spectacle of a particular sort, and indeed there is a
sense too in which the Niger delta has its own spectacularized form of
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accumulation through the oil and gas industry (‘black gold’, ‘petro-
dollar development’ and so on). This is the image world of the petro-
state and the transnational oil companies, and of course, since 2005
the extraordinary ability of the militants — the Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) most obviously and its
charismatic and articulate spokesperson Jomo Gbomo — to unleash
their own barrage (images of hostages, exploding pipelines) in the
image war.
So let me return to your question of how the financial crisis is being
seen in the delta. First, there is a profound sense among Nigerian
intellectuals of yet another US double standard. After two decades
of having neoliberal governance talk and the need for transparency,
accountability and good government forced down their throats by
Bush apparatchiks and their multilateral allies like the World Bank, it
turns out that the push toward financialization of the global economy
has produced nothing more than the rankest forms of greed, venality,
government failure, crony capitalism and outright fraud. From the
vantage point of Nigeria — in which nobody doubts the depth of
political and economic corruption and everyone fully understands
that no politician, military official or high ranking businessman has
ever been prosecuted for any form of malfeasance — it is mildly
astonishing to see that this Wall Street crisis is protected too by a
culture of complete impunity. It represents (even under Obama) a
socialization of the costs of failure and malfeasance.
Second, there is the question of how this crisis is perceived in the
creeks by the militants. In a nutshell, since early 2006 the insurgency
has rendered the oil fields utterly ungovernable. Output has fallen
and a number of construction and engineering companies have halted
activity orwithdrawn their operations. Some areas are under lockdown
and the federal military forces patrol the creeks in a cat and mouse
game with militants of varied stripes (some are organized criminals
other promoters of a political project called ‘resource control’). The
political economy of what is now a well-armed insurgency is held
together in part by oil bunkering (oil theft) in which there is complicity
between the militants and gangs who patrol the movements of barges
in the creeks and tapping of pipeline and manifolds, and the military
and political class who oversee the trade. The financial crisis is felt
among the ranks of the insurgents as a further deepening of the crisis
of the oil industry. The likes of MEND are media savvy playing off
their political demands against their ability to roil world oil markets
by disrupting production. In this sense everyone benefits from high oil
prices: the militants through bunkering, the oil companies who post
record profits in spite of the increasing costs of doing business, and
the government by pocketing ‘excess crude revenues’. The financial
crisis has detonated a global economic recession and the bursting of
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the speculative oil bubble. Whether (as in the past) low prices will
produce pressures to expand oil bunkering, or whether reduced oil
revenues flowing through the region (through the revenue allocation
process) will deepen existing resentments and tensions among and
between contending political forces on the oil fields is hard to predict.
It is interesting that the militants who have adopted a critical stance
with respect to the international oil companies were very much aware,
during the catastrophic events of late 2008whenWall Street seemed to
be on the point of imploding, of an important legal case brought against
Chevron in the San Francisco federal circuit court by villagers from
the Ilaje area in the delta who alleged human rights violations against
their communities by the company. The decision when rendered went
against the Ilaje plaintiffs and this decision was widely seen in the
creeks as another instance of corporate impunity — consistent with a
larger picture of business as usual in Nigeria and on Wall Street.
Third, the international oil companies, already feeling that their
‘social licence to operate’ has been compromised by the insurgency,
see the collapse of the investment banks and the tumbling oil price as
a source of enormous uncertainty for the industry as a whole given the
contradictory pressures of OPEC (to reduce output tomaintain prices),
the credit crunch and their need to continue expensive and risky deep
water offshore oil developments, and the imperative to shed workers
in an industry already hemorrhaging huge amounts of money. The
oil companies face a financial, operational and legitimation crisis —
and in regard to the latter one wonders whether Shell’s decision in
June 2009 to settle in the legal case brought to the southern New
York Federal District Court was not a reflection of the fears of having
another messy and public display of Big Oil corruption and influence
peddling (rather than the worry of a legal defeat, which always struck
me as unlikely).
Finally, there is the political class, a broad swath of politicians,
high ranking civil servants and military who historically have had to
balance feeding at the deep trough of oil wealth against the need to use
oil revenues to purchase political consent in a highly competitive and
unstable multi-ethnic post-colonial state (or perhaps we should say
federal system) which has seen, especially since the return to civilian
rule in 1999, three important processes at work: a significant decen-
tralization of corruption to the states and local governments, a major
enhancement of oil revenues to the oil-producing states through the
principle of derivation, and not least the emergence of enormously
powerful (and wealthy) governors and senior politicians and their po-
litical machines (known locally as ‘godfathers’) who have deployed
armed thuggery to deliver votes. All of this has produced the de-
mocratization of the means of violence (of which the insurgency is
part).
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The question, then, is what the financial crisis might mean for the
political class presiding over this rickety, contradictory and venal
system — currently in the hands, once again, of the powerful north-
erners but led by a weak, compromised and sick President Yar’Adua?
Already the financial crisis has had ramifications throughout the oil-
economy as I outlined earlier: the value of the Naira has crashed,
an already rickety banking system is staggering under the weight
of an international credit crunch, food prices in the cities are rising
quickly, and the anticipated reduction in government revenues neces-
sarily compromises the ability of the current administration to balance
powerful regional and class forces. A sustained and deep global re-
cession would, in short, be a massive perturbation to this system and
the challenges to the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) gov-
ernment, in spite of its strength in a number of the states, would be
profound. The sorts of political forces unleashed by such an eventu-
ality — and the ramifications for both the US and the world of such
an explosive scenario given the geo-strategic importance of oil and
gas — might well be as combustible as oil itself.
MA: Towards the end of your recent book with the photographer Ed Kashi
(Curse of the Black Gold), there is a quote by the late Ken Saro-
Wiwa from his 1990 article ‘The Coming War in the Delta’: ‘The
Delta people must be allowed to join in the lucrative sale of crude
oil . . . only in this way can the cataclysm that is building up in the
Delta be avoided. Is anyone listening?’ (p. 217). To what extent would
redistribution of oil wealth help cure the problems of Nigeria?
MW: You mentioned Ken Saro-Wiwa, the great human rights and environ-
mental activist and leader of the Movement for the Survival of the
Ogoni people (MOSOP) who was hanged by a military tribunal in
November 1995, so let me attempt to answer your question about the
distribution of oil revenues by commenting on his political project
and his own trajectory in moving from a well-connected civil servant
and man of letters to an activist. The Ogoni struggle which Saro-
Wiwa came to lead in 1990 became one of the iconic indigenous
struggles of the late-twentieth century — the Chipko and Narmada
movements in India and Chico Mendez’s rubber tappers movement
in Amazonia might be others — but it has also been mythologized
in ways that occlude the complexity of the struggle and of Saro-
Wiwa’s own views. In many ways Saro-Wiwa’s observation was
prophetic, a premonition of what was to become by 2006 a full-blown
insurgency; his non-violent tactics and popular mobilization as leader
of MOSOP had been replaced by the AK-47s and RPGs (rocket-
propelled grenades), the so-called ‘typewriters of the illiterate’. The
failure of his project— reflected both in the hanging of the Ogoni Nine
and in the fact that internal struggles within the movement after his
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death crippled MOSOP— provided the ground on which other ethnic
movements from below, especially that of the Ijaw in the late 1990s,
increasingly turned to a militant strategy against the slick alliance of
the oil companies and the military state that Saro-Wiwa railed against.
We do well to remind ourselves of what Saro-Wiwa’s ‘coming
war’ actually looks like at present across the Niger delta oilfields
which are, in effect, ungovernable. According to two reports released
in 2009 (The Coventry Cathedral Report, 2009; UNODC, 2009) the
value of oil that is stolen and shut-in (deferred as a result of insurgent
attacks) amounted to US$ 19 billion in 2007 and US$ 33 billion
in 2008, while in the first nine months of 2009 over 1,000 people
were killed and 300 hostages taken. In the last three years, Nigeria
has hemorrhaged oil revenues roughly equivalent to the GDP of the
fifteen poorest countries in the world.
In fact Saro-Wiwa’s gravest fears could not have anticipated the
calamitous descent into violence over the last decade, culminating
with the dramatic appearance of MEND with a massive attack on the
Opobo pipeline in Delta State in December 2005. The International
Herald Tribune (22 April 2007) captures vividly the brave new world
ushered in by MEND:
Companies now confine employees to heavily fortified compounds, allowing them to
travel only by armored car or helicopter . . . . One company has outfitted bathrooms
with steel bolts to turn them into ‘panic’ rooms, if needed. Another has coated the
pylons of a giant oil-production platform 130 kilometers, or 80 miles offshore, with
waterproof grease to prevent attackers from climbing the rig . . . . ‘I can’t think of
anything worse right now’, said Larry Johnson, a former US Army officer who was
recently hired to toughen security at a Nigerian site operated by Eni, an Italian oil
producer. ‘Even Angola during the civil war wasn’t as bad’.
Shell alone, the largest operator accounting for almost half of all oil
output, had lost US$ 15 billion since late 2005. By any estimation, the
costs of this oil insurgency are vast.
The genesis of the insurgency, led primarily by Ijaw youth groups
of varying political (and sometimes criminal) persuasion speaks to
some of the contradictions and tensions within Saro-Wiwa’s own po-
litical project (incidentally a new novel by Richard Patterson [2009]
entitled Eclipse, which is based on Saro-Wiwa and the Ogoni strug-
gle, attempts, rather unsuccessfully in my view, to grapple with this
complexity). He saw ethnic politics as the great stain on post-colonial
Nigeria — the serial dominance of the ethnic majorities over the
minorities — yet he deployed ethnicity as a way of doing politics
himself. There was a genuine tension between what Ike Okonta has
called his civic nationalism and his indigenous (ethnic) parochialism.
Saro-Wiwa stitched together— constructed— a sense of Ogoni iden-
tity bursting at the seams with internal contradictions: among and
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between elders and youth, ruling families and well-connected Ogoni
politicians, women and men, and especially among and between the
separate Ogoni kingdoms themselves. Containing these tensions —
and at the same time projecting his movement outward to the likes
of international organizations like Greenpeace and the UN — proved
to be difficult (some might say futile) and faced with the massive vi-
olence meted out by President Abacha’s military and security forces
perhaps doomed to failure. The insurgency of which MEND is simply
one part reflects precisely this political complexity and fragility (who
exactly is MEND, for whom do they speak, what exactly is their po-
litical project, made in the name of ‘resource control’?) and not least
the challenges associated with your question of the redistribution of
oil wealth.
MA: In view of these challenges, do you think a redistribution of oil wealth
is possible given that both the Nigerian state and global capitalism are
dependent on oil?
MW: In one sense there has been a redistribution of oil wealth. First, the
indisputable fact is that the majority of revenues increasingly flow
to the Nigerian Exchequer (when oil prices reach the sort of levels
seen in 2008 the suspicion is that Nigeria pockets 80–90 per cent of
the value of each barrel of Bonny Light). Second, let’s recall that
President Obasanjo upon coming into power in 1999 changed one of
the principles of revenue distribution, the so-called derivation prin-
ciple — that is to say the proportion of the revenues derived from a
resource that are retained by the state in which it is located. Obasanjo
increased derivation to 13 per cent (it had plummeted to 1 per cent
by the early 1990s) and this had the effect (along with inflated world
oil prices after 2001) of flooding the Niger delta states with huge
quantities of petro-dollars. This has resulted in the parallel decen-
tralization (and parcellization) of corruption to the state and local
government levels. In turn this influx of money while adding almost
nothing to human development has bankrolled the colossal wealth
and power of regional political ‘godfathers’ and their venal machine
politics.2
The derivation percentage continues to be an object of intense polit-
ical struggle. In the debates surrounding constitutional reform the delta
states have at various times demanded 25 per cent derivation, even
50 per cent. But even if the federal government were to increase
derivation as a desperate sop to political stability — to attempt to
purchase the insurgents’ consent through revenue allocation — there
2. There is a recent television documentary by a US media group, Frontline, on corruption
and the involvement of oil and oil-service companies in Nigeria which your readers may
wish to see: http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/.
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is absolutely no reason to believe that a tripling or quadrupling of
allocation would have any positive development effects without a
massive overhaul of state machinery including accountable state in-
stitutions and civil society organization with sufficient power, repre-
sentation and civic depth (and participation) to exercise meaningful
fiscal oversight. In this sense if resource control as a political pro-
gramme simply translates into more money, the future of the Niger
delta looks very bleak. But the reality is that the state cannot relinquish
control over oil — it has a statutory monopoly over all mining rights
backed up by about fifty pieces of legislation which institutionalize
its control over the industry — for the simple reason that since the
end of the civil war (1970) the ‘mere geographical expression’ other-
wise known as Nigeria has only held together by virtue of the ability
of the state to shovel huge quantities of money to powerful politi-
cal constituencies most especially in the non-oil producing North. A
radical decentralization of control over oil — resource control a` la
lettre — would be political suicide. And in the wake of the amnesty
which ended on 4 October 2009 — and the decision by many of the
militant leaders to accept the amnesty and disarm — the question of
what the federal government is actually prepared to offer remains the
fundamental question.
MA: What is the role of ‘Big Oil’ in this setting?
MW: The question of how all of this relates to corporate interests and to the
geo-strategic significance of oil is intriguing. Big Oil has no interest
in internal revenue distribution as a matter of corporate interest: it is
concerned with profit. But profit can only be secured through what the
industry calls the ‘social licence to operate’. At present that licence
has eroded to the point where their ability to pump oil is utterly com-
promised (the costs of doing business are in other words enormous and
they have no legitimacy as such). On the other hand if oil is US$ 100
a barrel the grotesque and rickety structure of oil and gas can all
stagger along and still make money (in mid and late 2008 corporate
quarterly earnings of Chevron and Shell were at historic highs). At
US$ 40 a barrel it all looks rather different. To this extent peace — or
a degree of stability— in the delta is very much in their interest. Partly
by default and partly by design, the oil companies assumed a major
developmental role in the delta through their community development
efforts and the massive expenditures — called cash payments — that
were made to chiefs, politicians, youth groups and so on in the vain
hope that throwingmoney around would keep the oil flowing. It didn’t
and as the companies have reluctantly acknowledged it contributed to
the conflicts and violence across the oilfields. Big Oil, in short, is in a
very tight spot. Walking away from multi-billion dollar investments
is not possible and neither (as many thought) is hiding offshore on
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deep water platforms — as the assault on the Bonga platform in June
2008 vividly showed.
MA: How does the geopolitical and strategic significance of oil affect these
dynamics?
MW: Again, the US has no interest in internal revenue distribution. But in
the background stand energy security policy, tight oil markets, and
what President Obama no longer refers to as the GlobalWar on Terror.
African oil, especially since 2001, has becomeof considerable national
strategic interest to the US. General James Jones, in testimony offered
to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005, claimed that the
US goal must be ‘to eliminate ungoverned areas, to counter extrem-
ism, and to end conflict and reduce the chronic instability’ because of
Africa’s ‘potential to become the next front in the Global War on Ter-
rorism’.3 A year later at the African Seapower Conference in Abuja,
Admiral Harry Ulrich, the European Commander of US Naval Forces
Europe and Africa in referring to Shell’s massive Bonga oil field —
Nigeria’s largest oil field, lying within territorial waters — admitted
that American ships were patrolling Nigerian oil fields within the 200
mile limit. In the wake of the establishment of an African Command
in February 2007 — put on hold late in the Bush administration but
revived by Obama — the US is now in search of a forward operating
base capable of securing oil assets in the Gulf of Guinea. The per-
ception that Nigeria is being squeezed from the north (the pan-Sahel,
anti-terror initiative) and from the south (the militarization of the Gulf
of Guinea) is likely to be a major source of tension and destabilization
as the Nigerian government attempts to dowse the flames in the Niger
Delta.
MA: My favourite picture in the Curse of the Black Gold is on pp. 20–21
showing women baking tapioca in the heat of a gas flare. To me the
picture captures the essence of the field of political ecology in whose
development you have been a key figure.
MW: Yes, I admire that photograph too — but I suppose my own favourite
(perhaps that is not quite the right word) is the series of images (pp.
121–7) in a Port Harcourt abattoir which conveys much of the apoca-
lyptic character of lives shaped by oil and gas. Let me say firstly that
the book you refer to was a five year collaboration with New York
photographer Ed Kashi, and the experience of working with someone
with vast international experience (Ed has worked extensively in the
Middle East and has a more than passing familiarity with the oil and
gas industry) and a sort of critical, visual sensibility was extremely
3. See ‘On the Petroleum Frontier’, 6 January 2007: http://www.ludd.net/retort/msg00730.
html.
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generative. I came to see the Niger delta through, as it were, a differ-
ent lens, and especially to understand the landscape — and I should
say that landscape studies have a deep history in my discipline of
geography — through forms of scarification, sacrifice, abandonment,
despoliation and erasure. The collaboration became for me at any rate
an account of the aesthetics of the oil industry, but to place the aes-
thetics of the current moment on a larger historical canvas of world
commodities and hyper-exploitation. The longue dure´e´ of the Niger
delta— and this incidentally is why the book contains some extraordi-
nary historical images unearthed from photographic archives around
the world and powerful essays on this history by Ugo Nwokeji and
Ukoha Ukiwo — demands that we see gas flaring and the violence of
the oil industry as part of half a millennium of serial repetitions, or
more properly, recursive primitive accumulation embracing the age of
palm oil and slavery. The book tries to alert the reader to the historical
continuity between the slave ship and the oil tanker — and more gen-
erally to the making of the Black Atlantic and modern trans-Atlantic
capitalism. It was by working with Ed that I came to see the landscape
in this way and to focus more carefully than I had previously on the
detritus, the waste and the scars of a ruined landscape.
Your observation on the gas flares deployed as outdoor tapioca
ovens— as a compelling if horrifying instance of political ecology—
is surely right. Throughout its history Nigeria has been one of the
largest (and through the 1990s, the largest) flarers of gas in the world.
Almost 90 per cent of associated gas was flared. While the percent-
age of flaring has fallen, in absolute terms the flaring levels have
remained the same for twenty years. In an aggregate sense, the Niger
delta gas flares were estimated to be the largest point source of carbon
emissions in the world. A Global Gas Flaring Reduction Programme
initiated by the World Bank and the Norwegian government in 2002
attempted to place pressure on governments and companies to re-
duce flaring levels, but the 2008 deadline adopted by ‘stakeholders’
in Nigeria failed miserably and with much finger-pointing on both
sides (the companies and the government) the zero-flaring date is
now 2011.
The image depicts a woman cooking tapioca in close proximity to a
horizontal flare in which the vented gas burns at terrifyingly high tem-
peratures. The flares themselves burning, or more accurately roaring,
twenty-four hours a day create a nightmarish toxic environment for
communities located nearby. Some children living in the shadow of
the enormous vertical flaring systems have never seen full darkness. It
is a measure of the delinquency by companies and government alike
that so little basic scientific research has been conducted on the health
consequences of flaring and while environmental impact assessments
(EIAs) are conducted in the course of all engineering projects for the
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industry, the EIAs are rarely made public and are often of dubious
scientific credibility.
The abject horrors of women cooking food — and in a sense incin-
erating themselves — must be positioned in relation to corporate and
state conduct (to an ‘ethics’ of human disposability and abrogation
of human rights). Associated gas can be captured and re-injected into
reservoirs, it can be delivered to an end user (a gas turbine), or it
can be liquefied. For decades none of these things happened on the
grounds that there was no local market and because the companies
could operate with impunity. The fact that Nigeria continues to empty
massive quantities of gas into the atmosphere — perhaps one-quarter
of the world flare emissions— after a half century of oil and gas oper-
ations is an abomination. But, and here we return to political ecology,
it is a product of a particular political economy, of the dynamics of
oil-based primitive accumulation and dispossession, and of the ‘slick
alliance’ (the language was Ken Saro-Wiwa’s) that came to constitute
the Nigeria petro-state.
Of course gas is consumed locally now. The largest liquefied natural
gas plant in Africa (and one of the largest in the world) is situated
on Bonny Island, south of Port Harcourt. Nigeria is, after all, seen
by the industry as primarily a huge gas reservoir with some oil —
which is to say the future of Nigeria from the vantage point of energy
resides in gas. The massive infrastructure of the Bonny LNG plant —
located on the site where slaves were gathered in the seventeenth
century and oil palm exported in the nineteenth — has devastated
the ecology of the island. Ruling families on Bonny fight among
themselves as to whether they have legitimate dynastic claims to the
vast rental and other payments made by the oil companies. Bonny
LNG is now in effect a bunker: most local boat traffic is impossible,
withworkers flown in by helicopter to secured compounds confronting
the force of MEND insurgents and pirates operating in the Cawthorne
Channel. In February 2009 the former CEO of Halliburton/KBR, one
of the contractors for the LNG plant, was found guilty by the US
Securities and Exchange Commission of bribing Nigerian officials
with payments of close to US$ 200 million. So we are back to the
political economy — and to the political ecology of the sacrifice of
Bonny Island.
MA: Broadening our discussion for a moment, could you tell us about your
intellectual influences and how they’ve changed over time?
MW: My own formation as regards political ecology emerged from a con-
fluence of political and intellectual forces in the late 1960s and 1970s.
One was left politics in the 1960s in London, another the study of
the environment in geography (what was then called cultural ecol-
ogy) at University College, London; and then, after a period of
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working in West Africa where coincidentally both of these issues
surfaced in the form of the Sahelian famine of the early 1970s, at the
University of Michigan. I had certainly been influenced by Marxist
theory (originally by reading Edward Thompson) and by an exceed-
ingly immature involvement in local Trotskyist politics when I was
in grammar school. But at Michigan I was confronted with some very
important work being done in ecological anthropology and cultural
ecology, which addressed the question of adaptability and resiliency
in human-ecological (and typically) peasant systems, as well as the
hard-edged Marxian political economy in which I was also immersed
(at Michigan this included Mick Taussig, Eric Wolf and Frithjof
Bergmann) including naturally the Althusserian modes of produc-
tion, and New Left Review sorts of debates in and around European
Marxism.
In other words I was shaped by the struggle to provide an account
of the environment and biophysical processes that took the social rela-
tions of production, the agrarian questions and the logics of accumu-
lation seriously. It was a research programme wrestling with whether
ecological theory and the properties of systems could in some way
be retained or integrated with a Marxian account of property, social
relations, class and power. That for me at any rate is what political
ecology in the 1970s and 1980s endeavoured to do — and I think
succeeded admirably in the work of people like Susanna Hecht, Piers
Blaikie and others. Of course, there were important differences within
this body of work as regards what political economy entailed in con-
ceptual terms—whether this was warmed-over world systems theory
or structural Marxism— and as a result political economy sometimes
oscillated between functionalist ecology and deterministic ‘logic of
capital’ arguments. But this body of work provided a powerful critique
of Malthusianism, of technological determinism and of the conven-
tional wisdom that formerly self-equilibrating societies were losing
their ability to adapt and regulate their environment because of the
approach of ‘the market’. In this latter regard Bernard Nietschmann’s
Between Land and Water (1973) — his study of commercialization
along the Miskito Coast—was an important bridge (in effect a sort of
Polanyian bridge) between the earlier cultural ecology and the more
critical political ecology.
Political ecology of the sort I have described has deepened and
in a sense fragmented — or at least met up with parallel theoretical
developments in other fields. Within political economy there was a
much deeper engagement with Marxist theory and Marx’s notion of
metabolism as a way of thinking about society–nature relations —
a project that ecological Marxism (one thinks of James O’Connor’s
work on the second contradiction of capitalism) and David Harvey’s
geographical historical materialism engaged with (as indeed did the
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labour process approach of Ted Benton). But there was also a sort
of threefold dispersal of the original political ecology research pro-
gramme which, driven in part by post-structuralism, contained for
example, the following: first, a broader sense of the forms of politi-
cal contention entailed by political ecology (Nancy Peluso and Anna
Tsing’s important works, for instance); second, a focus on forms of
knowledge, expertise and practice (this was of course inspired by
Michel Foucault and what one might call ‘green governmentality’ but
also encompassed work on regulatory institutions and the knowledge–
power–practice seen vividly in Michael Goldman’s 2005 book Impe-
rial Nature on the World Bank); and third, a return to the cultural
construction of nature pioneered by arguably Berkeley’s greatest ge-
ographer Clarence Glacken (author of Traces on the Rhodian Shore,
1976) but with a much more robust sensitivity to Raymond William’s
historical semantics and the traffic between ideational and material
worlds (I would point to Jake Kosek’s book Understories, 2006, as a
case in point). I like to think — immodestly — that Berkeley played
a major role in the second phase of political ecology (even if polit-
ical ecology lost some of its conceptual coherence): ‘Berkeleyans’
such as Judy Carney, Richard Schroeder, Jake Kosek, James Mc-
Carthy, Jesse Ribot, Julie Guthman, Scott Prudham, Karl Zimmerer,
Rod Neumann, Donald Moore and Iain Boal have been central to this
electricity within the field, and incidentally in shifting the geograph-
ical focus of political ecology to the advanced capitalist states, and
especially the intersection of neoliberalism and the environment (see
for example the new edited collection Neoliberal Environments by
Nik Heynen et al., 2007).
I would be the first to admit that these sorts of theoretical excur-
sions—propelled by Foucault, Latour, Serres, Callon and Law among
others— have added considerable vitality to the field, but I have come
to believe that it has passed over some of the knotty problems and the-
oretical potential within the political economy research programme.
To that extent the work of Mike Davis — and his Olympian reach ex-
tending from famine to avian flu to fire ecology to the slum world —
seems to me to point a way forward. I am not sure in that context how
to answer your question about how my ideas have changed. Proba-
bly, alas, not very much. I still regularly return to the likes of Perry
Anderson and the New Left-inspired works of the 1970s. For the past
twenty-five years I have been part of a San Francisco Bay Area collec-
tive RETORT which is a motley group of 1960s types, some shaped
by ‘situationism’, others by the US student Left (SDS) and anti-prison
movement, others by anarchism andMarxism. This has been a lifeline
for me and the fact that we have all, in different ways, circled around
the question of what does the Left mean any more coupled with a
politics of anti-enclosure has been enormously influential.
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MA: Could you reflect on the contemporary relevance of geography as a
discipline?
MW: This question is complicated because the discipline’s relevance has
a very different institutional resonance on each side of the Atlantic
(to say nothing of across the global south). Geography is very weakly
institutionalized in the US and indeed was by-passed in (and failed to
capitalize upon) the opportunities presented by the 1960s and 1970s
boom around environmental studies. This is quite the reverse, for ex-
ample, in the UK where geography has emerged as a major academic
industry with links to key labour markets outside the realm of the
academy. But the core problems of the discipline — spatial knowl-
edges and practice, and the nature–culture–power–economy nexus —
seem to me to speak to the heart of the social sciences (and, if I may
draw from Michael Burawoy’s work on sociology, to a robust set of
ideas speaking to public policy and critical geographies). Certainly
the return of environmental crisis talk framed by global dynamics
(global climate change among them) has reaffirmed the centrality of
scale, location and network which are at the heart of the geograph-
ical lexicon. There is some enormously generative work around the
intersection of territory, rule and identity (and again this is generative
across a number of key disciplines including the works of ‘crypto-
geographers’ like Bob Jessop, Saskia Sassen, Tania Li, Neil Brenner
and Arturo Escobar). And I would be remiss if I did not refer to the
exciting work on geographical knowledges, not only the sort of work
on critical geographical information systems pioneered by John Pick-
les, but the powerful work on maps as technics of power central to
state building (something gestured to by Ben Anderson in his account
of nationalism) and to the birth of the modern itself (readers may wish
to consult the works of Joe Bryan, Brian Harley, and the new book by
Denis Wood and John Fels, The Nature of Maps, 2008). I’m a great
fan of the discipline. It is frankly such an interesting intellectual space
to occupy at the intersection of the social sciences, the biophysical
sciences and the humanities. Don’t take my word for it, go read David
Harvey, DoreenMassey, Gillian Hart, Sharad Chari and Bruce Braun.
MA: You have written extensively about violence, particularly but not
limited to the Nigerian context. How did your interest in the study of
violence develop?
MW: The short answer, I suppose, is that I backed into it. I have always been
envious of those scholars capable of laying out multi-year research
programmes and doggedly working on them until completion. Virtu-
ally everything I have written over the last three decades has been as
much a product of serendipity and chance as of deliberate planning
and forethought. My interests in Islam were triggered by the emer-
gence of a popular Muslim insurrection in Kano in the early 1980s
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and by my old friend Paul Lubeck’s exemplary work on the political
economy of the changing political cartography of Islam in northern
Nigeria; my incursion into the rice paddies of Californian agriculture
was the product of a family friend who was an influential farmer near
Davis, California; a paper on land reform and post-socialist reform
in northern Vietnam emerged from an all too brief trip with some
Berkeley colleagues to Vinh Phu province as part of an interuniver-
sity exchange;my book on contract farming emerged from a telephone
conversation with Peter Little and a grant from the Institute of De-
velopment Anthropology. All of these opportunities surfaced in the
midst of doing something else. And not least, there have been two
decades and more of working with RETORT which has been for me
an intellectual and political lifeline, but it goes without saying that
writing in small groups is rather like herding cats. Vast quantities of
beer have been consumed over the years at the ‘Pig and Whistle’ in
San Francisco lubricating conversations and writing projects many of
which have yet to see the light of day. Indeed they never will see the
light of day.
All of which is to say — and I shall return to your question about
studying violence — is that I have often become enamoured with
events and processes through coincidence and chance occurrence. But
reliance upon the twist of fate as a research strategy comeswith its own
risks and burdens, and when coupled with my own limited attention
span and dilettantish disposition,makes for a highly circuitous, uneven
and discontinuous approach to research and towhat in theUS academe
is referred to, in Taylorist fashion, as ‘scholarly productivity’. There
is another huge downside, too — namely that I have a mountain
of unfinished papers (intriguing ideas, or so I thought) that came to
naught and an unmatched track record in failing to ferry manuscripts
through to some sort of finality or closure. In my defence I would
acknowledge that I have been seduced into directing awide assortment
of programmes and centres at Berkeley (including a decade or more
running the Institute of International Studies); in practice I have been
administering some programme or other in all of my thirty odd years
on campus. Perhaps these diversions are the cost of spending one’s
whole working life at the same institution. The upshot is that they
have deepenedmy sense of failure, a feeling of never quite completing
anything properly. As I sit in my office, I look with considerable scorn
(and,it needs to be said, embarrassment) at the boxes of materials I
laboriously and assiduously collected duringmy time inKerala (India)
in 1992 and fromMansajang inTheGambia (in themid and late 1980s)
about which I have written absolutely nothing. It’s not pretty.
Studying violence was, in keeping with this serial serendipity, once
again a by-product of something else. I had published a book twenty-
five years ago entitled Silent Violence, an idea I took from the brilliant
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work on food and famines by Pierre Spitz. In conducting fieldwork
near Katsina in northern Nigeria, in the wake of the great Sahelian
famines of the late 1960s and early 1970s, I grappled with the idea
of ‘structural violence’ produced by the complex commodification of
food systems in pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonialNigeria. It was
an analysis taken from the playbook of Karl Polanyi (and Jim Scott)
but informed inmyown case by theMarxist debates over structural and
other approaches to modes of production and the cultural Marxism of
the 1970s. Starvation was, as I saw it, produced by particular systemic
forces, though the ‘violence’ inflicted upon starving bodies was not
in any simple sense — and here lay the paradox — the product of
state or other forms or coercion, and neither was the immiseration and
starvation characterized by conflict, resistance or violence (whether
banditry, food theft or attacks on state agents or institutions). In fact it
was passivity and diffidence thatmarked thesemoments of subsistence
crisis — starving people rarely rebel — and in this absence the forces
of consent seemed overwhelming. Hence, the title of my book. If I
had read Michel Foucault back then I might have been less confused
but probably even more depressed.
Of course, the history of post-colonial Nigeria has been one of ex-
traordinary and unrelenting violence. Almost immediately after the
independence celebrations, violence marred the first (and subsequent)
elections, and then came a string of military coups followed by ethnic
and communal conflicts and a civil war of such abject horror that it
became the touchstone for much of the humanitarian internationalism
which came of age in the 1970s and 1980s. When I lived in Katsina
town in the 1970s I discovered the remains, not far from my com-
pound, of a building in which a number of Ibo had been slaughtered
in 1966; in this centre of ruling class Hausa culture and civility, were
these invisible ruins of unimaginable atrocity. So violence was cer-
tainly laden in the history of the region I studied and lived in during the
heady oil-boom years of the 1970s. But it was the Muslim insurrec-
tion in Kano in 1980 led by a populist charismatic leader, Maitatsine,
which drew me to a more sustained examination of violence and in
this case the relations between political Islam and the urban political
economy associated with the oil boom. In this instance the conflicts
between a ragtag army of migrants in the old city and the state secu-
rity forces were of less interest than the ways in which oil revenues
had transformed the relations between state and society and city and
countryside. It was another spasm of more sustained state violence —
the militarization of the Ogoni regions and the hanging of the Ogoni
Nine in November 1995 — which provoked me to contrast the Ogoni
struggle in the Niger delta with the Muslim insurrection in the north.
Petro-capitalism seemed tome to provide the ground fromwhich these
very different sorts of movements and conflicts were generated.
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It was in fact the Ogoni struggle which drew me to start work-
ing on the oilfields of the Niger delta and to this extent my field work
has documented a remarkable transformation: fromKen Saro-Wiwa’s
non-violent struggle — which was aborted by Abacha’s henchmen in
1995 — to something like a full blown insurrection in 2009. To this
extent my recent writing has been almost wholly concerned with vio-
lence and conflict, but this time at the very heart of the oil universe,
on the oil fields themselves. This descent into the dark and dangerous
world of petro-violence has taken me from warring youth groups in
Nembe, to inter-ethnic violence in Warri, to inter-community strug-
gles of oil-bearing lands to, most dramatically, the rise of a guerrilla
struggle led by MEND (in effect a sort of franchise for a massive
array of insurgent groups). The challenge has been to grasp the co-
ordinates and the circumference of the wide social field of violence
in the contemporary Niger delta while attentive to the specific and
peculiar dynamics of particular conflicts— and all the while retaining
a sense of the bigger picture, what I call the operations of the ‘oil
complex’.
The Niger delta is now entering a new and perhaps catastrophi-
cally dangerous period as state security forces embarked (beginning
on 13 May 2009) upon a fully-fledged military assault on MEND
forces in Delta State and are now (mid June 2009) extending their
military operations — Operation Search and Rescue — to Rivers and
Bayelsa States. In the Oporoza-Okerenkoko area — the homeland of
the Gbaramantu clan and the military camp of the charismatic MEND
leader Tompolo—hundreds of people have been killed and thousands
of people displaced. When human rights and other civic groups are
permitted into the region the full horror of the aerial bombardments
will become clear. The blowback from the Ijaw militants will be fero-
cious. Which is to say that I fully expect to be writing about violence
for some time to come.
MA: Your web page at Berkeley mentions that you are currently writing
a book on poultry and capitalism. Could you tell us more about this
project?
MW: Well, as I was saying . . . here’s another project twenty years in the
making. And still not a great deal to show for it! Its origins lay in my
work on contract production in African agriculture, and specifically
some work I conducted with Judy Carney of UCLA on the Jahally-
Pachar project—a large-scale, intensive rice project in centralGambia
in which smallholder growers were retained under contract. What was
clear empirically was that the contracting of a grower— a purportedly
autonomous and free peasant household unit of production — was in
effect a regimented control of the domestic labour process in which
a patriarchal head of household bore the responsibility of mobilizing
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labour ( junior sons and wives) to meet the demands of the project
management. The contract inevitably confronted what Robert Brenner
called the ‘solidity of pre-capitalist relations’ — in this case the social
relation of control over property and labour. Meeting the demands
of the contract turned in practice on whether the household head
could deliver on labour (which was in reality the expertise of women
rice growers) which in turn demanded a resolution of the loss of
property rights incurred by women whose individual rice fields had
been appropriated by the projects and designed as collective fields by
the male head of household. In short, the domestic unit of production
was converted into a theatre of struggle and conflict in which contract
output and performance turned on the negotiations of the conjugal
contract (what husbands and wives in particular could bargain for and
achieve through force or consent).
Contract production in Africa was, during the 1980s, something of
a new frontier for agrarian investment by public and private interests.
Promoted by the World Bank and other development agencies, con-
tract production was configured as a form of smallholder development
in which productivity could be raised (in Jahally Pachar by central-
ized irrigation perimeters permitting double and triple cropping) and
new niche markets opened up (especially in the case of fresh fruits
and vegetables, such as green beans, cut flowers or melons, for Euro-
pean markets in particular). It seemed to me to be a twentieth century
iteration of the classic agrarian question — a new route to agrarian
capitalism in which peasants became what Lenin called ‘propertied
workers’.
Much good work has now been conducted on contracting and con-
tract growers and their relation to agribusiness. Contracting and re-
lated forms of vertical integration are now a staple in the analysis of
what Phil McMichael, Harriet Friedmann and others call the global
agro-food system. Some of this excellent research on contracting has
appeared in Development and Change I might add. I was interested
in two aspects of contracting. One was the ways in which contracting
posed obvious parallels with the contracting and subcontracting in in-
dustrial manufactures (and relatedly the Fordist–post-Fordist debate).
It seemed to me that agrarian contracts not only had a long and deep
history — here I was deeply influenced by Douglas Holmes’ brilliant
1989 book Cultural Disenchantments on worker–peasantries — but
also that complex forms of contracting in agriculture were forerunners
of the sorts of decentralized sub-contracting systems which emerged
within advanced capitalism during the 1970s and 1980s.
The second and related question was contract farming’s historical
origins and genesis. This led me in the first instance to understand
some of the large state-organized projects, often products of the colo-
nial period, in which peasants or farmers were contracted (under more
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or less forced circumstances). The Gezira Scheme in Sudan and many
of the Japanese imperialist sugar schemes in Taiwan and Korea dis-
played such characteristics. However, all roads ultimately led back to
the US poultry (broiler) industry which was revolutionized after the
Great Depression from a dispersed small farm sort of enterprise to one
dominated by integrators (large agribusiness concerns like Tyson’s),
many of whom backward integrated from feedstuffs into contract
production, and contract growers who were contracted to grow out
young chicks in specified houses and facilities which the grower pro-
vided. These large, integrated grow-out systems involving thousands
of growers emerged in the US south and recruited from poor south-
ern tenant farmers. The growers were indeed propertied (and often
highly indebted) labourers and moreover were compelled to compete
with each other (in so-called tournaments) as a basis of determining the
prices theywould receive for the broilers. All of this inevitably led into
a detailed consideration of the contracts themselves and the sorts of
power relations involved in the contract schemes and how the relation
between grower and integrator was part of a larger poultry complex (I
wrote on this topic with William Boyd, now a lawyer teaching at the
University of Colorado, Boulder, and William’s dissertation explored
this question in more detail). The broiler complex, in sum, was a just-
in-time production system before just-in-time (kanban) appeared care
of Toyota and the Japanese motor industry. In fact I was astonished
to discover that a group of Japanese capitalists who visited the US in
the wake of the Japanese defeat in the Second World War were more
interested in the US poultry industry than American Fordism!
So here was another diversion and serendipity. I came to learn
about the US (and increasingly global) poultry sector which began
with growers in the US south but ended up in the White House (some
of the biggest contributors to Bill Clinton’s campaign and presidency,
given his humble origins in Arkansas — the heart incidentally of the
US poultry industry — were the big broiler capitalists!). At the heart
of the poultry industry was, it seemed to me, a much bigger story:
how, as the chicken magnate Frank Tyson put it, the chicken came
to control, ‘the center of the American plate’. The poultry industry is
arguably the most mechanized and industrialized of US agricultural
commodities (a project inwhich state-backed research and sciencewas
harnessed to produce a chicken capable of maturing rapidly through
the systematic applications of drugs and chemicallymanufactured feed
and dietary supplements . . . and as the nightmare of mass confinement
became clear, medication). The industrial chicken is transformed in
a matter of weeks — the genome of the chicken was one of the first
full genomic mappings— into a grotesque, steroid-enhanced creature
carrying disproportionately large amounts of breast meat. The chicken
is in other words a cyborg.
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Andof course chicken products— there are over 200 in their various
fast food forms—were central to the changing US diet: that is to say,
the decline of red meat and a concern with a healthier portfolio of food
choices. Need I say that free range, organic chicken has also become a
staple of the organicsmovement. All ofwhich is to say that in the lowly
chicken is a much bigger story of American capitalism, the relations
between agriculture and industry, the mechanization of the natural
world—as SeigreidGeidion put it inMechanization Takes Command,
‘what happens when mechanization confronts organic substance?’
(1948: 12)— the transformation of diet and its relation to the changing
contours of class and identity, the political economy of the US state
and big money politics, the US immigration question, and much else.
Since I first thought about this project there has been a huge boom
in food studies, from the more popular work of Michael Pollan to
detailed case studies of almost every agro-food commodity imaginable
(from broccoli to strawberries). Steve Striffler (2005) has also written
a terrific book on the US poultry industry from the vantage point
of the processing plants, an industry which Human Rights Watch
determined as one in which labour abuses and human rights violations
were systematic and widespread. And I need not mention the animal
rights movements and the question of the incarceration and torture
of the chickens themselves (a sister institution of confinement is of
course the zoo). But in a curious way the ‘big picture’ book— at least
as I conceive it — has still to be written. Maybe I’ll get to it in my
next life.
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